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I. OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN 
CHINA (SINCE 1985) 
A. TRANSPARENCY IN VILLAGES AND ENTERPRISES 
One of the most important consequences of China’s economic 
reform, which began in its rural provinces in 1978, is the practice of 
transparency.1 Disclosure of information related to public affairs first 
occurred in 1985, when Villagers’ Committees (“VCs”)—
autonomous organizations that manage the public affairs of 
villages 2 —made fiscal, land use, and home planning records 
available to interested villagers.3 Despite the adoption of open village 
affairs by several provinces, including Jiangsu, Shandong, and 
Henan, the practice was not codified until much later, when, in late 
2004, the General Office of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (“CPC”) and the General Office of the 
 
 1. For more information on these reforms, see Jinglian Wu, Understanding 
and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform 104-27 (2005) (discussing, among 
other things, the adoption of “contracting” and “responsibility”). 
 2. Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa (村民委员会组织法 ) [Law on the 
Organization of Villagers’ Committees] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of 
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 1998, effective Nov. 4, 1998) art. 2 (China), 
translated in http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/23223/23228/22926.htm. 
 3. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzheng bu jiceng zhengquan he shequ 
jianshe si (中华人民共和国民政部基层政权和社区建设司) [Bureau of Basic-
Level Admin. & Cmty. Constr.], Quanguo xietiao xiaozu bangongshi (全国协调小
组办公室) [Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs], Cun wu gongkai (村务公开) [Open 
Village Affairs] 11-12 (2004). 
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State Council issued the Notice on Open Village Affairs and 
Democratic Management in the Countryside, “proving” its “positive 
achievements.” 4  The Notice also included suggestions on how to 
perfect open administration of village affairs, demonstrating a desire 
by the government and the governing political party to push 
transparency forward after nearly ten years of “self-governance” on 
the issue.5 Transparency in rural areas progressed remarkably, lifting 
the “Bamboo Curtain” on public affairs from autonomous villages 
and then government administration. 
In the late 1990s, transparency spread from rural to urban areas, 
affecting state-owned and collectively owned enterprises (“SOEs” 
and “COEs,” respectively)6 as well as other public organizations. As 
a confirmation of the pioneering wave of open government affairs 
and as a guide to the future operation of transparency, the General 
Offices of the CPC Central Committee and of the State Council 
promulgated the Notice on Further Openness in the Affairs of SOEs, 
COEs, and Their Holding Companies on June 3, 2002.7 Later that 
 
 4. See Guanyu Jianquan Wanshan Cunwu Gongkai He Minzhu Guanli Zhidu 
de Yijian (关于健全完善村务公开和民主管理制度的意见) [Notice on Open 
Village Affairs and Democratic Management in the Countryside] (promulgated by 
the Gen. Offices of the Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China [CPC] & 
the St. Council, June 22, 2004, effective June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Notice on 
Open Village Affairs], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-
07/12/content_1591421.htm. 
 5. See id. (outlining procedures to improve rural governance by creating a 
group to monitor and implement “village affairs,” as well as to give farmers a 
voice in decisions regarding land use, land transfer, and financing, among others). 
 6. See Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui Shuji Wei Jianxing Daibiao 
Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui Changwu Weiyuanhui Suozuo De Gongzuo 
Baogao(中央纪律检查委员会书记尉健行代表中央纪律检查委员会常务委员会
所作的工作报告) [CPC Comm’n for Discipline Inspection], “Jia da lidu, biaoben 
jianzhi, tuidong fan fubai douzheng shenru kaizhan” de gongzuo baogao (《加大
力度，标本兼治，推动反腐败斗争深入开展》 的工作报告) [1998 Annual 
Report] (delivered by Sec’y Wei Jianxing on Jan. 13, 1999), reprinted in THE 
PEOPLE’S DAILY, Mar. 1, 1999, at 3, available at http://www.people.com.cn/ 
GB/channel1/11/20000804/172106.html. 
 7. See Guangyu Zai Guoyou Qiye, Jiti Qi Ye Ji Qi Konggu Qiye Shenru 
Shixing Changwu Gongkai Zhidu de Tongzhi (关于在国有企业、集体企业及其
控股企业深 入实行厂务公开制度的通知) [Notice on Further Openness in the 
Affairs of State-Owned Enterprises, Collectively Owned Enterprises and Their 
Holding Companies] (promulgated by the CPC Cent. Comm. & the St. Council, 
June 3, 2002, effective June 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/ 2002/content_61564.htm (mandating 
publication of all development plans as well as reform and merger proposals, and 
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same year, the National Panel on Coordination of Open Enterprise 
Affairs estimated that over 250,000 enterprises, including over 
190,000 public organizations (SOEs and COEs) 8  as well as over 
57,000 private enterprises, had introduced transparent management.9 
The first official statement on government transparency appeared 
in 1988, when the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee 
proposed disclosure of all administrative regulations, procedures, and 
decisions in preparation for democracy.10 By the late 1990s some 
laws and regulations began to contain principles of openness.11 In his 
1997 report to the Fifteenth National Convention of the CPC Central 
Committee, then-General Secretary Jiang Zemin stressed the 
“principles of fairness, justice and openness.” 12  Thereafter, the 
 
other similar events, so that workers can participate in the decision-making). 
 8. See generally 2002 Nian chang wu gongkai dashiji (2002年厂务公开大事
记) [Chronicle of Events in Factory Affairs, 2002], QUANGUO CHANG WU GONGKAI 
MINZHU GUANLI WANG (全国厂务公开民主管理网 ) [THE NETWORK FOR 
DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT ] (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.cwgk.org/template/ 
10001/file.jsp?cid=10&aid=8. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See LIU JIE (刘杰), ZHIQING QUAN YU XINXI GONGKAI FA (知情权与信息公
开法 ) [THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND LAWS ON INFORMATION DISCLOSURE] 246 
(2005). 
 11. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa (中华人民共和国行
政处罚法 ) [Law on Administrative Penalty] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996) (China), translated in 1996 P.R.C. 
LAWS art. 4, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/11/content_ 1383613.htm (“Administrative Penalty shall be imposed in 
adherence to the principles of fairness and openness . . . . Regulations on 
administrative penalty to be imposed for violations of law must be published; those 
which are not published shall not be taken as the basis for administrative 
penalty.”). Article 31 requires parties to be notified of both “the facts, grounds and 
basis on which the administrative penalties are to be decided” and the rights of 
remedy which are required before a decision of penalty is imposed. In addition, 
Articles 42 and 43 of the Law provide a right to and prescribe a procedure for 
public hearings. The Temporary Regulations on State Civil Servants also stated the 
principle of openness in the employment of civil servants. See Temporary 
Regulations on State Civil Servants, art. 2 (promulgated by the St. Council in 
1993, superseded by the Civil Servants Law on Jan. 1, 2006). 
 12. Jiang Zemin (江泽民 ), Pres., Report at the 15th Nat’l Cong. of the 
Communist Party of China: Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping 
Theory, for an All-Around Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics in the 21st Century (江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国
代表大会上的报告：高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，把建设有中国特色社会主义
事 业 全 面 推 向 二 十 一 世 纪 ) 12 (Sept. 12, 1997), translated in 
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.htm, available at http://news. 
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practice of open government started to blossom throughout the 
country, almost simultaneously with the assistance of “e-
government.”13 
Government transparency and economic reform in modern China, 
as a consequence of the earlier reforms in rural China, is no 
coincidence. Transparent administration of government affairs, a 
prerequisite for public participation and oversight, 14  is a basic 
necessity of market economies. Later practice of transparency in 
SOEs and COEs also evinces the link between economic reform and 
information disclosure. Managers of both villages and firms 
distributed information related to fiscal and administrative affairs to 
their members to meet the demands of democratic management and, 
therefore, to make villagers or workers more productive.15 However, 
the consequences of transparency experiments in economic matters 
went well beyond the bounds of economic affairs, penetrating public 
organizations and, eventually, administrative agencies.  
B. LOCAL EXPERIMENTS 
The Rules on Open Government Information of Guangzhou 
Municipality (“2003 Guangzhou Rules”)16 are generally credited as 
the first official legislation on open government information 
(“OGI”). Although the city of Guangzhou did spawn the government 
 
xinhuanet.com/zilia/2003-01/20content_697189.htm. 
 13. See LIU supra note 10, at 247-48 (reporting a surge in laws and judicial 
decisions supporting the need for government transparency). 
 14. See Notice on Open Village Affairs, supra note 4, § 1. In fact, in the early 
1980s, attempts at open village affairs were always followed by public 
participation and supervision. See LUOPING HAN (罗平汉), CUNMIN ZIZHI SHI (村
民 自 治 史 ) [HISTORY OF VILLAGERS’ SELF-GOVERNANCE] 112-16 (2006) 
(describing the implementation of open village affairs in various provinces in 
China). 
 15. See Notice on Open Village Affairs, supra note 4, § 3 (elaborating on 
openness as precondition of villagers participation and supervision). 
 16. Guangzhou Shi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Guiding (广州市政府信息公开规
定 ) [Rules on Open Government Information of Guangzhou Municipality] 
(promulgated by Executive Order No. 8, Nov. 6, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003) 
(China), http://www.people.com.cn/item/flfgk/dffg/1992/D442053199204.html 
[hereinafter 2003 Guangzhou Rules], available at http://www.freedominfo.org/ 
documents/provisions.pdf (Jamie P. Horsley, Yale Law Sch. trans.) (stating that 
the law was formulated specifically “to protect the right to know . . . , standardize 
the making public of government information, [and] increase the transparency of 
administrative activities”). 
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transparency movement, this actually happened ten years prior to the 
2003 Guangzhou Rules—in 1992. The Temporary Rules on Open 
Government of Guangzhou Municipality (“1992 Temporary 
Rules”)17 not only confirmed early transparency efforts undertaken 
by government agencies (albeit without binding legal effect), but also 
provided supporting authority for future administrative action. The 
Rules defined “open government” (Article 3), delineated the scope of 
openness (Article 7), and prescribed basic procedures for openness 
(Articles 9 to 20).18 
With more than ten years of experimental practice, the Guangzhou 
municipal government was well prepared to take the leap to the 2003 
Guangzhou Rules.19 For the first time in China’s history, the “right to 
know” was provided formally by statute.20 The principle of openness 
was also proclaimed. 21  The 2003 Guangzhou Rules set forth two 
means of information disclosure: agencies may release government-
held information upon their own initiative 22  or upon request. 23 
Moreover, agencies should disclose requested information unless 
 
 17. Guangzhou Shi Renmin Zhengfu Gongkai Zhengwu Huodong Shixing 
Banfa (广州市人民政府公开政务活动试行办法) [Temporary Rules on Open 
Government of Guangzhou Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No. 
67, July 9, 1992, effective July 9, 1992, expired Jan. 1, 2003) (China), available at 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1200/21752/21754/21766/21791/2006/4/pa240
55224334600212000-0.htm (Chinese version). The Rules were abolished on 
January 1, 2003, the day on which the 2003 Guangzhou Rules came into effect. 
 18. See id. arts. 3, 7, 9-20. 
 19. No official translation into English yet exists for the 2003 Guangzhou 
Rules. The Chinese version is available at the official website of the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government: http://www.gz.gov.cn/vfs/content/newcontent.jsp?content 
Id=233199&catId=4099. For an introduction to and commentary on the Rules in 
English, see Jamie P. Horsely, Guangzhou’s Pioneering Foray into Open 
Government, CHINA BUS. REV., July-Aug., 2003, available at www.chinabusiness 
review.com/public/0307/horsely.html (using the SARS epidemic as an example of 
China’s continued struggle against its culture of secrecy and renewed commitment 
to transparency). 
 20. 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, art. 1 (describing the protection of 
the “right to know” as a purpose of this statute). 
 21. Id. art. 6.1 (providing the general rule that government information shall be 
made public). 
 22. Id. arts. 9-11 (obligating disclosure of government decisions, for example, 
procedures, resolution of major matters, finances, and government personnel). 
 23. Id. art. 13.1 (allowing persons to request the disclosure of information not 
listed in Articles 9 through 11). 
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such disclosure is clearly prohibited by law.24 
The 2003 Guangzhou Rules gave rise to a new round of the local 
transparency movement. The cities of Shenzhen, Chengdu, Shanghai, 
Chongqing, Wuhan, Datong, Hangzhou, Changchun, and Ningbo 
followed up successively the following year by promulgating similar 
rules or regulations; provinces also joined this wave of OGI 
legislation, thus making 2004 the “year of government 
transparency.”25 These rules and regulations served as the main legal 
authority for disclosure of government information by local 
government until 2008, when the central government promulgated a 
new regulation, discussed below in Part II. 
C. INFLUENCES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In addition to domestic motivations for government transparency, 
where economic factors yielded a legal-political result, international 
law also significantly influenced China’s march towards 
transparency. On one hand, access to the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) pushed, if not triggered, Chinese OGI legislation at both 
the local and the national level; on the other hand, experiences of 
other countries also provided examples for China to reference when 
considering reforms. 
1. WTO Regulations 
As China approached its accession to the WTO in the late 1990s, 
its study of the WTO extended beyond academia; the officers and 
staff of nearly every government agency were busy educating 
themselves about the WTO. When people began to view the WTO 
Agreements from a legal perspective, rather than a “purely 
economic” one, the obligations that the WTO might impose on the 
Chinese government, and the legal consequences arising therefrom, 
attracted public attention. Scholars, and later officers, began to 
realize that the WTO’s influence would inevitably affect many 
aspects of Chinese administrative law even though the WTO 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. For detailed information of local legislation of government information 
disclosure, see generally LIU WENJING (刘文静), WTO TOUMINGDU YUANZE YU 
WOGUO XINGZHENG GONGKAI ZHIZU (WTO 透明度原则与我国行政公开制度) 
[THE WTO PRINCIPLE OF TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA’S INSTITUTION OF OPEN 
GOVERNMENT] 40-50 (2008). 
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Agreements were originally written to regulate only domestic laws 
relating to international trade.26 It became evident that it is almost 
impossible to differentiate between laws and regulations relating to 
international trade from those not, especially because a WTO 
Member’s government must adjust its domestic legislation to 
“comply” with its WTO obligations. 27  The WTO principle of 
transparency, for example, has played a major role in the reform of 
Chinese administrative law. The principle, found in almost every 
covered agreement, was enunciated in Article 2(C)(1) of Protocol on 
the Accession on the People’s Republic of China 28  and later 
interpreted in Article 324 of the Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China.29 In carrying out reform, China sought to ensure 
the compliance of legislation closely related to international trade 
(for example, the 2003 Law on Government Procurement)30 as well 
 
 26. See LIU WENJING (刘文静), WTO GUIZE GUONEI SHISHI DE XINGZHENGFA 
WENTI (WTO规则国内实施的行政法问题) [IMPLEMENTING WTO REGULATIONS 
IN CHINA: ITS INFLUENCES ON CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 48-56 (2004). This 
book discusses the influences of WTO regulations on important aspects of Chinese 
administrative law, including uniform administration and allocation of 
administrative powers, transparency, standard and scope of judicial review, and 
administrative licensing, viewing WTO regulations as “international administrative 
law.” Id. chs. 1, 3-6.  
 27. See Donald C. Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for 
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 97, 98 (2003) (noting that law 
professors have welcomed the pressures that WTO membership imposes on 
transparency because it moves China’s government to a more limited and 
transparent form). 
 28. See World Trade Organization [WTO], Protocol on the Accession of the 
People’s Republic of China, ¶ 2(C)(1), WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.
pdf (permitting China to enforce only the “laws, regulations and other measures 
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign 
exchange” that are published or made available to other WTO Members, 
individuals, and enterprises). 
 29. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, ¶ 324, WT/MIN(01)/3 (Nov. 10, 2001), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan002144.pdf 
(alleging that, at this point in the accession process, China’s laws have not reached 
the level of transparency necessary to comply with the WTO Agreement and Draft 
Protocol, and encouraging China to use the Internet to make its laws publicly 
available). 
 30. See Yao Zhenyan (姚振炎), Vice Chairman, Fin. Econ. Comm., Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Address at the 9th Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm., 
“Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Caigou Fa (Caoan) de 
Shuoming” (关于《中华人民共和国政府采购法 (草案 )的说明》 ) 
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as general legislation on government transparency (for example, the 
2003 Guangzhou Rules).31 The influence of the WTO Agreement can 
be seen not only in the “General Provisions” chapter of a particular 
statute, where the principle of openness or transparency is 
articulated, 32  but also in local legislation on government 
transparency. 
2. Experiences of Other Countries 
The implementation and practice of government transparency in 
China has been influenced greatly by other countries’ experiences. 
With the introduction of statutes on administrative procedure by tens 
of other countries (many of them were translated into Chinese by 
scholars) since the late 1990s, and with the important role played by 
academic experts at almost all levels of legislation, the experience of 
other countries has been merged into newly established Chinese laws 
and regulations related to government transparency, as well as to 
other aspects of administrative procedure. Legislators and officers, 
often lacking legal expertise, sought help from professors more and 
more frequently in drafting bills. 33  When a bill dealt with the 
procedure of public participation, law professors and other legal 
experts would offer comments and suggestions that were informed 
by foreign experiences. Sometimes, foreign experts made 
suggestions directly. Perhaps the best example is the collaboration 
 
[Interpretation of the Government Procurement Law (Draft)] (Oct. 22, 2001), 
available at http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/20/20050710215503.htm 
(mentioning the impact of the WTO on Chinese procurement).  
 31. See Guangzhou Municipal Gov’t, Legal Affairs Office, Introduction to 
Open Government Information Work by the Guangzhou Municipal Government, 23 
GOV’T INFO. Q. 1, 11 (Mar. 20, 2006) (noting that comprehensive compliance with 
WTO requirements necessitates openness of government information). 
 32. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Caigou Fa (中华人民共和国
政府采购法) [Law on Government Procurement] (promulgated by Presidential 
Order No. 68, June 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), translated in 2002 P.R.C. 
LAWS, available at http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/08/content_75023 
.htm (prescribing that “[g]overnment procurement shall be conducted in line with 
the principle of openness, transparency” (Article 3) and that “[b]id invitation and 
tendering activities shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of 
openness” (Article 5)). 
 33. Anne Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting Legislation for 
Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 1 (1996) 
(commenting on the use of American lawyers in drafting twenty-two laws for the 
People’s Republic of China under the United Nations Development Programme). 
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between the Office of Legislative Affairs of Guangzhou Municipal 
Government and The China Law Center of Yale Law School, who 
together drafted the Guangzhou Municipal Measures on Public 
Participation in Formulating Rules in 2005.34 
II. THE STATE COUNCIL’S OGI REGULATIONS  
Promulgated by China’s State Council in 2008, the Regulations on 
Open Government Information (“State OGI Regulations”) summed 
up the experiences of earlier local legislation, establishing a uniform 
procedure for administration of OGI for localities and administrative 
agencies. 35  While the State OGI Regulations are clearly far from 
perfect, they nonetheless stands as a striking mark for further steps 
toward government transparency. 
 
 34. Legal experts who collaborated at the July 2006 workshop titled “Public 
Participation in Rulemaking,” in Guangzhou, China, July 2006, include: Professors 
Jamie P. Horsley and Jeffrey P. Prescott of The China Law Center, Yale Law 
School; Professor Jeffrey S. Lubbers of the Washington College of Law, American 
University; Mr. Neil Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation and 
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Transportation; as well as several Chinese law 
professors, including the author of this article. For a brief introduction to this 
collaboration, see Is China’s Government Becoming More Open?: An Interview 
with Jamie Horsley, Deputy Director of The China Law Center at Yale Law School 
(Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/3061.htm 
(remarking that Guangzhou Province’s experimental use of “both open information 
and public participation mechanisms [was] adapted in part from U.S. practice”). 
See generally Guangzhoshi Guizhang Zhiding Gongzhong Canyu Banfa (广州市
规章制定公众参与办法) [Measure on Public Participation in Formulating Rules 
of Guangzhou Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No. 4, June 27, 
2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) art. 1 (China) (The China Law Center trans.), 
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual _Life/CL-PP-
Final_GZ_PP_MeasuresFinal__tr9-4-09_%28Eng%29.pdf (“These measures are 
formulated in order to promote and standardize the work of public participation in 
the course of formulating rules . . . .”). 
 35. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli (中华人民
共和国政府信息公开条例 ) [Regulations on Open Government Information] 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 17, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) (China) 
[hereinafter State OGI Regulations], available at http://www.greenlaw.org.cn/ 
files/laws/State%20Council%20Information%20Disclosure%20Regs.pdf. 
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A. ACHIEVEMENTS 
1. Special Office for OGI Works 
The State OGI Regulations prescribe that special offices for OGI 
work—being designed by local governments and their departments at 
the county level and above—undertake specific OGI matters, 
maintain and update government information, organize the 
compilation of OGI guides and annual reports, and conduct 
examinations for secrecy for the administrative agency to which the 
special office belongs.36 The establishment of special offices for OGI 
in fact made government information disclosure more convenient 
and smoother, as well as more standardized and, thus, more easily 
supervised. 
2. Scope of Disclosure 
Local rules on OGI, before the 2008 State Regulations, differed in 
listing the assorted information that should be disclosed. Those 
differences were actually due to the myriad confusing ways of 
classifying government information. For example, some local rules 
classified very specific administrative decisions such as “requisition 
of land [and] documents about house demolition,” 37  or “series 
numbers of permits for the Middle School Entrance Exam and 
University Entrance Exam, and the scores of the examinees.” 38 
 
 36. See id. art. 4. 
 37. See Shanghaishi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Guiding (上海市政府信息公开
规定 ) [Rules on Open Government Information of Shanghai Municipality] 
(promulgated by Executive Order No. 19, Jan. 20, 2004, effective May 1, 2004) 
art. 8(B)(3) (China) (The China Law Ctr. trans.), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Shanghai_Municipal_Provisions.pdf; see 
also Chengdushi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Zanxing Guiding (成都市政府信息公开
规定 ) [Rules on Open Government Information of Chengdu Municipality] 
(promulgated by Executive Order No. 105, Mar. 29, 2004, effective May 1, 2004) 
art. 10(9) (China); Wuhanshi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Guiding (武汉市人民政府
信息公开暂行规定 ) [Temporary Rules on Open Government Information of 
Wuhan Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No. 156, May 31, 2004, 
effective July 1, 2004) art. 7(2)(4) (China). Both Shanghai and Chengdu revised 
their Rules in 2008, bringing the relevant provisions in compliance with the State 
OGI Regulations. 
 38. See Shenzhenshi Zhengfu Xinxi Wang Shang Gongkai Banfa (深圳市政府
信息网上公开办法) [Rules on Open Government Information on Internet of 
Shenzhen Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No.130, Feb. 25, 2004, 
effective April 1, 2004, superseded by Shenzhenshi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai 
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Others listed comparatively abstract categories, such as “powers on 
decision-making,” “fiscal administration,” or “personnel.”39  
The 2003 State Regulations provided a uniform way of classifying 
government information that should be open to the general public. It 
first listed the type of information that should be disclosed by the 
agency without request. This included, for example, information 
“that involves the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or other 
organizations,” “that needs to be extensively known or participated 
in by the general public,” “that shows the structure, function and 
working procedures of and other matters relating to the 
administrative agency,” and “that should be disclosed on the 
administrative agency’s own initiative according to laws, regulations 
and relevant state provisions.” 40  The law then prescribed that 
administrative agencies should “determine the concrete content of 
the government information to be disclosed on their own initiative 
within their scope of responsibility” 41  in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 9 of the State OGI Regulations, and emphasized 
disclosure of specific government information listed thereafter.42  
3. Methods and Procedures for Disclosure 
Both categories of information disclosure—upon an agency’s own 
initiative, or from an agency pursuant to a request—are outlined in 
the 2003 State Regulations. Article 15 states requirements for 
information disclosure on an agency’s own initiative, through 
government gazettes, official websites, press conferences, 
newspapers and other publications, radio, and television. 43  State 
archives and public libraries are required to make access to 
government information convenient for the general public. Agencies 
are also encouraged to set up materials request stations, information 
bulletin boards, and electronic information screens to disclose 
information.44 Agencies are responsible for releasing information that 
 
Guiding (深圳市政府信息公开规定) [Rules on Open Government Information of 
Shenzhen Municipality], Sept. 1, 2006) art. 7(X) (China). 
 39. See 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, art. 9. 
 40. See State OGI Regulations, supra note 35, art. 9. 
 41. See id. arts. 10, 12. 
 42. See id. arts. 11. 
 43. See id. art. 15. 
 44. See id. art. 16. 
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they made or stored45 within twenty business days from the date that 
it was generated or updated.46 Moreover, agencies are required to 
comply and publish OGI guides and catalogues, and to update them 
in a timely manner.47 
Request procedures are also provided, albeit in a primary form that 
lacks sensitivity to every contingency. Such procedures include 
format and content requirements,48 guidelines for responding under 
different circumstances,49 instructions for dealing with conflicts of 
interests,50 response formatting requirements,51 and pricing.52  
4. Supervision and Safeguards 
Article 31 of the 2008 State Regulations requires annual reporting 
by all agencies. 53  It elaborated to a certain extent upon other 
comparatively abstract requirements such as “periodic inspection”54 
by “the departments in charge of OGI work and supervision 
agencies.”55 Compared to the simple statement of whistleblowing and 
remedy in Article 33, liabilities caused by agencies’ violation of the 
Regulations provided in Articles 34 and 35 are more detailed.56 
 
 45. See id. art. 17. 
 46. See id. art. 18. 
 47. See id. art. 19. 
 48. See id. art. 20 (requiring a written application, but allowing verbal requests 
when it would be prohibitively difficult to apply in written form). 
 49. See id. arts. 21-22, 24 (signaling that differences arise depending on 
whether or not it is government information to be disclosed, or when the 
information does not exist). 
 50. See id. art. 23 (requiring the administrative agency to solicit a third party’s 
opinion, and, if the third party disagrees with disclosure, the agency may not 
disclose the information, unless the information serves the public interest). 
 51. See id. art. 26 (providing information in the format the applicant requires). 
 52. See id. arts. 27-28 (allowing the agencies to collect a processing fee for 
their services). 
 53. See id. art. 31. 
 54. See id. art. 29 (mandating periodic inspection of information disclosure 
work in various levels of government). 
 55. See id. art. 30 (giving the responsibility of supervising information 
disclosure to “competent” governments). 
 56. Compare id. art. 33 (providing administrative reconsideration or 
adjudication for whistleblowers), with id. arts. 34-35 (listing numerous crimes such 
as failing to fulfill disclosure obligations, failing to update contents of previously 
disclosed information, and charging fees in violation of relevant provisions, 
together with detailed penalties for an administrative agency that violates the 
Regulation). 
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B. DEFICIENCIES 
1. Limited Scope of Disclosure 
Chapter II of the 2008 State OGI Regulations establishes the scope 
of information that should be disclosed on an agency’s own 
initiative. This chapter implies that there should be no disclosure 
unless the matter explicitly meets criteria found therein. Serving as a 
general statement on the scope of disclosure, Article 9 uses vague 
phrases—such as “[information that] involves the vital interests of 
citizens” and “[information that] needs to be extensively known or 
participated in by the general public”—that leaves broad discretion 
to custodial agencies, which are naturally inclined to not release their 
information. 57  Similar phrases are found in Articles 10-12, which 
give local governments the power to “determine the concrete content 
of the government information to be disclosed on their own initiative 
within their scope of responsibility.”58 “Information on the approval 
and implementation of major construction projects” that should be 
disclosed by government at the county level and above (Article 
10(8)), for example, could be held up in a dispute over the meaning 
of “major construction projects.”59 “Important and major matters in 
urban and rural construction and management”60 and “information on 
the construction of social and public interest institutions”61 are also 
ambiguous phrases and it will be easy for agencies to keep the 
requested information away from the general public. 
2. Unclear Resolution of Conflicts of Interest 
A conflict of interest is likely the toughest issue that an agency 
will face when fulfilling an information disclosure request. Agencies 
must withhold information that “involves state secrets, commercial 
secrets or individual privacy.”62 Leaving the big issue of state secrets 
aside, there are still exemptions on this withholding: the information 
 
 57. See id. art. 9 (stating that this kind of information must be disclosed, but 
failing to provide examples). 
 58. See id. arts. 10-12. 
 59. See id. art. 10(8) (failing to provide guidance on what constitutes vital 
information with regards to a major construction project). 
 60. See id. art. 11(1). 
 61. See id. art. 11(2). 
 62. See id. art. 14(4). 
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mentioned above “may be disclosed by administrative agencies with 
the consent of the rightholder(s) or if administrative agencies believe 
that non-disclosure might negatively impact the public interest.”63 It 
is hard to imagine a serious dispute arising over whether a 
rightholder gave consent, but disputes seem inevitable over the 
meaning of “impact the public interest.”64 No procedure is provided 
to guide any possible controversy over the meaning of “major 
impact,” “public interest,” or more importantly, the balance between 
the interests of public and private parties.  
Deficiencies stemming from the absence of conflict resolution 
procedures are evident in Article 23 of the State OGI Regulations, 
where both grounds for a valid disclosure decision and the 
procedural protection of privacy and trade secrets appear vague and 
ambiguous. When agencies believe commercial secrets or privacy 
might be implicated by a disclosure request, seeking a third party’s 
opinion is always indispensable. What should be the grounds for 
withholding the requested information when the third party claims 
privacy or commercial secrets? The principle that “[i]f the third party 
does not agree to have the information disclosed, the information 
may not be disclosed” leaves both agencies and the third parties a 
possible excuse for nondisclosure. That is, it is the opinion of the 
rightholder(s), rather than the consideration of the agencies, that 
stands as the official ground of declining a request.65 
 
 63. See id. (allowing disclosure upon the rightholder’s approval or his failure to 
contest the disclosure). 
 64. Id. 
 65. On October 17, 2008, less than six months after the State OGI Regulations 
had gone into effect, the Commodity Price Bureau of Zhengzhou, Henan Province, 
denied Zhao Zhengjun’s request for disclosure of financial statements of the 
Zhengzhou Heating Corp., the provider of heating service to the citizens of 
Zhengzhou, because the statement contained commercial secrets. The People’s 
Court of Zhongyuan District, Zhengzhou Municipality, Henan Province overturned 
the Commodity Price Bureau’s decision on appeal, holding that third-party 
objection is an insufficient basis for denial of a government information request. 
See Zhao Zhengjun v. Zhengzhoushi Wujiaju (赵正军诉郑州市物价局) [Zhao 
Zhengjun v. Zhengzhou Mun. Commodity Price Bureau] (Henan People’s Ct. Mar. 
26, 2009) (China), available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200903/ 
26/350326.shtml. The court decision is unlikely to deter other agencies from 
denying a disclosure request on similar ground for at least three reasons: (1) The 
Chinese legal system, a civil law system, does not follow stare decisis; (2) a local 
district court (basic People’s court in the Chinese court system) is unlikely to be 
persuasive authority to other courts; and finally, (3) media coverage of the case 
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If the third party’s opinion is not accepted, when should they be 
informed by the decision-making agency? The State OGI 
Regulations do not provide a clear answer. Article 14 states relevant 
information “may be disclosed” without the consent of the 
rightholder(s)—that is, the third party—“if agencies believe that” the 
public interest may be involved.66 Article 23 states: “[The Agency] 
should disclose the information and notify the third party in writing 
of the content of the government information it has decided to 
disclose and the reason therefore.”67 Should an agency convey the 
decision to the third party before the requested information was 
disclosed to the requester, a sufficient remedy may still exist. But if 
the third party learns of the decision simultaneously or after the 
disclosure, damage could be unavoidable. Lacking the procedure of 
reverse-FOIA litigation, the ambiguous language of Article 23 of the 
State OGI could add confusion in dealing with interest conflicts. 
III.GOVERNMENT POWER VERSUS PRIVATE 
PARTY FREEDOM—A COMPARISON WITH U.S. 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS 
It is not difficult to list many differences in government 
transparency between China and the United States. Comparisons like 
this might be helpful to scholars who are unfamiliar with the 
pertinent institutions of a foreign country, but not for the purpose of 
a comparative law study. Comparison of the major differences, such 
as ideals, scope of disclosure and compliance with other laws, and 
the reason behind the different appearances may be helpful for 
mutual understanding. 
A. MAJOR DIFFERENCES 
1. Openness Versus the Right to Know 
The names of the major statutes on government transparency 
illustrate the basic difference between the government information 
policies of China and those of the United States. Chinese OGI 
 
indicates that both lawyers and the general public were more interested in the 
court’s result than its reasoning. Only time will tell. 
 66. See State OGI Regulations, supra note 35, art. 14. 
 67. See id. art. 23. 
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suggests that government agencies “open” information by using their 
administrative powers, whereas U.S. “freedom of information” 
(“FOI”) emphasizes the right of “any person” to access government 
information. With economic development being the overwhelming 
motivation behind almost every institutional construction including 
transparency in mid-1980s China, the inherent tension between 
public power and private rights in this sensitive area was almost not 
touched either by the general public or by immature lawyers and 
academics. Participants in the early transparency movement focused 
on “openness” as redress for the historically dominant tradition of 
pervasive secrecy. Unlike the initiation of FOI in the United States, 
where court precedent and scholarly discourse could support a “right 
to know” claim, 68  early transparency experiments in China were 
conducted by the collective work of villagers, enterprises, public 
organizations, the governing political party, and government 
agencies. No specific social class or organization like the U.S. press 
in the 1950s stood up to represent the people’s right to know and 
fight against the government’s power to control information. 69 
Because all participants were concentrated on advocating and 
carrying out the ideal of “openness,” common sense overwhelmed 
conflicts of interest. Neither conflict between private rights and the 
national interests nor that between different private rights was 
considered seriously. Borrowing mainly from the United States, in 
the early 2000s Chinese scholars began to mention the key phrase 
“right to know” and tried to bring it into statutes via participating in 
legislation. The 2003 Guangzhou Rules, drafted by the Office of 
Legislation of Guangzhou Municipality in collaboration with law 
school professors, 70  succeeded for not only being the first statute 
 
 68. See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO 
KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
8, 9-14 (1999) (suggesting that the “right to know” is limited to the “right to 
receive information,” derived from the First Amendment right to freedom of 
information). 
 69. See id. at 14-18 (detailing the struggle the press encountered during the 
1950s in retrieving information from the government); see also KENT COOPER, 
THE RIGHT TO KNOW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE EVILS OF NEWS SUPPRESSION AND 
PROPAGANDA xii-xiii (1956) (claiming responsibility for coining the phrase “right 
to know” and defining it as a citizen‘s entitlement to “have access to the news, 
fully and accurately presented”). 
 70. See LIU HENG (刘恒), ZHEHNGFU XINXI GONGKAI ZHIDU (政府信息公开
制度 ) [OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION] 192-93 (2004) (reflecting on the 
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(being local law according to Chinese Legislation Law) on 
transparency, but also the first statute that announces the protection 
of the right to know.71 Unfortunately, such a right is not found in the 
State OGI Regulations. 
2. Express Scope of Disclosure Versus Specific Exemptions 
Instead of exempting certain information from disclosure, like the 
U.S. Freedom of Information Act, the State OGI Regulations list 
what may be disclosed.72 Agencies can not only limit the scope of 
disclosure within the given list, but also enjoy broad discretion to 
decide whether specific data even falls within the given list because 
crucial definitions remain unsettled. Take, for example, Article 11(1) 
of the State OGI Regulations, which permits disclosure of “important 
and major matters in urban and rural construction and management”; 
what is “important” or “major”? Of course this determination is left 
to the discretion of the relevant agencies. Moreover, a list of 
exemptions implies a presumption of disclosure, which tends to 
satisfy the right to know, while a listed scope of disclosure implies 
the withholding of information. Although the 2003 Guangzhou Rules 
stated that disclosure of government information is a basic principal 
while nondisclosure is reserved for exceptional cases,73 Guangzhou 
principals were not transmitted to the 2008 State Regulations to have 
countrywide effect. 
 
collaboration between law professors and government agencies to draft the 2003 
Guangzhou Rules). 
 71. See 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, art. 1 (stating as its purpose the 
protection of “the right to know”). 
 72. Cf. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). The nine FOIA 
exemptions are: (1) classified information; (2) information related solely to internal 
personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) information specifically exempted 
from disclosure by statute; (4) privileged and confidential trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person; (5) inter- or intra-
agency memos or letters which would not otherwise be available by law; (6) 
personnel and medical files; (7) records or information compiled for law 
enforcement if disclosure could interfere with enforcement proceedings, the right 
to fair trial, disclose the identity of a confidential source, disclose techniques or 
procedures or guidelines that would risk the circumvention of the law, or could 
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; (8) information related to an 
agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; and 
(9) geological and geophysical information and data. Id. 
 73. See 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, arts. 1, 6. 
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3. Compliance with Other Laws and Regulations 
Secrecy suppressed transparency in China until the mid-1980s, 
when open administration blossomed from villages.74 State laws on 
government secrecy were established long before local legislation on 
OGI. The Law on Guarding State Secrets defined “state secrets” 
broadly, to encompass “matters that affect the security and interests 
of the state and, as specified by legal procedure, are entrusted to a 
limited number of people for a given period of time.” 75  This 
definition is illustrated with general categories of information such as 
secrets “concerning major policy decisions on state affairs,” “secrets 
in national economic and social development,” and “secrets of 
political parties that conform with the provisions of the preceding 
clause of this Article.”76 The amendments to the Law in 2010 made 
the procedure of defining state secrets (classification) and 
safeguarding them clearer and more practical. The general definition 
of “state secrets,” however, remains almost untouched from the 1989 
version. 
Archives law helped keep more secrecy in a way that requires “the 
administration and use of confidential archives, changes in their 
security classification, [while] the declassification of such archives 
must be effected according to the provisions of the laws and 
administrative rules and regulations of the State regarding secrecy.”77 
At the state level, the average term of declassification of a document 
kept by the State Archives is 30 years. 78  Although “archives 
 
 74. The first statute on government information in China after 1949 was the 
Provisional Regulations on Safeguarding State Secrets (Baoshou Guojia Jimi 
Zanxing Tiaoli (保守国家机密暂行条例)), promulgated by the State Council in 
1951. The Regulations remained in effect until 1989, when the Law on Guarding 
State Secrets was enacted. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia 
Mimi Fa (保守国家秘密法) [Law on Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989, 
revised April 29, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) (China), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?id=1191. 
 75. Id. art. 2. 
 76. Id. art. 8(1), (4)-(5). 
 77. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dangan Fa (中华人民共和国档案法 ) 
[Archives Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 
1987, effective Jan. 1, 1988, revised July 5, 1996) art. 14 (China), available at 
http://saac.gov/cn/ 
article.do?method=view&id=ff8080811172649a8011729fc01ca0019. 
 78. See id. art. 19 (noting that information pertaining to economic, scientific, 
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repositories shall regularly publish catalogues of records that are 
open to the public [and] create conditions and simplify procedures 
for the convenient use of archives,”79 the frequency of publishing 
open catalogues is unclear. Access to archives that are not yet open 
to the public is under the control of the National Archives and 
competent authorities, 80  thus leaving broad discretion to 
administrative agencies. 
Balance between transparency and secrecy is indeed the core value 
of FOI laws. There should be a series of laws and regulations 
collaborating to maintain this balance. First, there should be laws and 
regulations for OGI and open decision-making processes. Second, 
secrecy should be maintained in a manner that does not jeopardize 
privacy rights (mainly personal privacy and trade secrets). Third, 
dispute settlement and remedy procedures should be provided. In the 
United States, where a comparatively mature government 
transparency system has been implemented, major statutes, such as 
FOIA,81 the Government in the Sunshine Act,82 and the Privacy Act,83 
function reciprocally to achieve the balance between transparency 
and secrecy.84 Yet in China, where government secrecy has a strong 
historical tradition and transparency is still in its early phases, OGI 
legislation should be regarded as a kind of milestone of open 
governance, thus making it possible for advancements in 
transparency as well as in the balance between transparency and 
secrecy. With the definition of “trade secrets” in the 1993 Anti-
Unfair Competition Law and the interpretation by the SAIC 
afterwards, 85  protection of commercial interests related to 
 
technological, and cultural topics may be declassified earlier than 30 years). 
 79. Id. (requiring that citizens and organizations possess lawful identification to 
use the archives). 
 80. See id. art. 20. 
 81. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 82. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006). 
 83. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 84. Charles J. Wichmann, III, Note, Ridding FOIA of Those “Unanticipated 
Consequences”: Repaving a Necessary Road to Freedom, 47 DUKE L.J. 1213, 
1217 (1998) (informing that after the enactment of FOIA, the presumption in favor 
of disclosure thereby required agencies to defend nondisclosure). 
 85. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人
民共和国反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law] (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) art. 
10(3) (China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?id=648; 
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government information disclosure may get substantial legal basis. 
Yet procedural deficiencies remain to be overcome. Protection of 
privacy is a weak point in the absence of pertinent legislation. In 
recent years, scholars have been advocating for a national law to 
protect privacy or personal information. Open meetings are being 
held in some cities on agencies’ own initiatives,86 which have been 
lauded by the general public. This could be the overture of future 
legislation on open government meetings. 
B. MAIN FACTORS THAT MAKE THE DIFFERENCES 
1. Who Plays the Leading Role 
Unlike the FOI movement that took place in the United States 
during the 1950s, led by the press as an agent for the people’s “right 
to know”, 87  information disclosure in China has been mainly 
conducted under the guidance of the government and the governing 
political party, though it has been initiated from the bottom-up as 
well. Although open information of villages and enterprises affairs 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s was not really concerned with 
OGI, it warmed up the whole stage of transparency throughout the 
country. Transparency in villages and enterprises is a kind of testing 
or preparation for transparency in government agencies. That could 
be a possible reason for a series of official documents following the 
 
Guanyu Jinzhi Qinfan Shangye Mimi Xingwei de Ruogan Guiding (关于禁止侵犯
商业秘密行为的若干规定) [Certain Regulations of the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce on Prohibiting Infringements upon Trade Secrets (1998)] 
(promulgated by No. 41 Executive Decree of the SAIC, Nov. 23, 1995, effective 
the same day, revised by No. 86 Executive Decree of the SAIC, Nov. 23, 1998, 
effective the same day), available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/e957404c2b 
160b4e767fcf0f.html. Article 2 interpreted the term “trade secrets” explicitly. 
 86. In Dongguan city, Guangdong Province in South China, journalists from 
local media were invited to sit in a meeting held by the City Government of 
Dongguan on Dec. 17, 2005. That began the open meeting phase for this city. 
Although auditors are still limited to local media, all meetings of the city 
government except those dealing with personnel changes are open to journalists. 
See Dongguan Shixing Touming Bangong Jian “Yangguang Zhengfu” (东莞实行
透明办公建“阳光政府”) [City of Dongguan Working to Implement Transparent, 
“Sunshine Government”], NANFANG RIBAO (南方日报) [NANFANG DAILY] (Dec. 
8, 2005), http://www.sun0769.com/news/dongguan/sz/t20051208_62534.htm. 
 87. See generally FOERSTEL, supra note 68, at 14-35 (outlining the history of 
the right to know in the United States, including reactions from the press and the 
government). 
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unofficial transparency experiments, intentionally trying to guide the 
further ongoing of the movement. When transparency came into 
SOEs and public organizations, government information disclosure 
was inevitably involved.  
Government’s leading role can surely push the movement of 
transparency forward faster, while it may also weaken contention 
from civil society. The right to know is in fact the right to challenge 
the power to control information, and transparency cannot be a 
dominant principle without this challenge. When government 
dominates the process for providing transparency, such transparency 
becomes an ideal that relies largely on the self-restraint of the 
government itself. It is easy to understand why the scope of 
information disclosure tends to be narrow in this situation. 
2. Ideal of Procedural Justice and Relevant Legislation 
U.S. practice demonstrates that legislation of uniform 
administrative procedure (the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)) 
not only provides general legal authority for agency action, but also 
helps on secondary legislation, such as FOI laws and regulations.88 
Constitutional principles of procedural justice are elaborated upon in 
the APA, manifested by important guidelines on decision-making 
and dispute resolution.89 If a principle of procedural due process is 
not stated in a state or national constitution, as in the case of China, 
administrative procedure statutes are necessary to provide that 
process. Although the ideal of procedural justice has been embodied 
in more and more statutes on administrative procedure, the absence 
of a uniform law on administrative procedure adds to the difficulties 
of framing as well as enacting OGI laws and regulations. The 
obvious deficiency of Article 14 of China’s 2008 State Regulations 
shows the fatal procedural weakness that has been clearly seen in 
Zhao Zhengjun’s case, mentioned in Part II, footnote 66, of this 
essay.90 
 
 88. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006). 
 89. See id. §§ 556-557. 
 90. See State OGI Regulations, supra note 35, art. 14 (providing that Chinese 
government agencies have the discretion to release information containing 
commercial secrets or private facts “with the consent of the rightholder(s) or if 
administrative agencies believe that non-disclosure might give rise to a major 
impact on the public interest”). 
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3. Judicial Review 
In common law jurisdictions, judicial decisions can usually 
overcome possible weaknesses of statutes. This also helps them to 
deal with FOI cases more flexibly than civil law courts do. 
Moreover, significant precedents can also be justification to create a 
new statute, like what happened in the making of the U.S. FOIA. 
Civil law courts like Chinese ones are usually much less active, 
especially when resolving controversies involving new laws and 
regulations, such as OGI laws. Procedural deficiencies in China’s 
OGI statutes also obstruct progressive litigation. China’s 
Administrative Litigation Law, enacted 20 years ago (in 1990), had 
no specific provision on OGI-related litigation. On July 29, 2011, the 
Chinese Supreme People’s Court promulgated a judicial 
interpretation on OGI litigation. 91  This judicial interpretation 
provides a clear legal guidance on accepting an OGI lawsuit, which 
agency should be the defendant, the relevant burden of proof, and 
what kind of judgment should be made under different 
circumstances. 92  Unfortunately, it deals little with disclosure 
procedure, and therefore does not influence the broad discretion 
agencies enjoy in pertinent administrative procedure. Moreover, even 
if judicial interpretation can make up for the procedural deficiencies 
of the 2008 State Regulations, and provide more effective provisions 
for courts all over the country, it will not be compulsory in 
administrative procedures—courts are bound to the judicial 
interpretations of the Chinese People’s Supreme Court, but 
administrative agencies are not, unless their decision is brought to 
court. Comparatively passive action of courts limited the reaction 
from the judiciary branch, thus in turn reinforcing the power of the 
administrative branch in building (or not building, as the case may 
be) transparency. 
 
 91. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai 
Xingzheng Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理政府信息
公开行政案件若干问题的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases About Open 
Government Information] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, July 
2011, effective Aug. 12, 2011) (China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/ 
Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=8897. 
 92. See id. arts. 2-12. 
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IV.LESSONS LEARNED 
The need for the development of greater transparency in China has 
aroused international concern recently for both economic and 
political reasons. Reading legal provisions on OGI is an easy way to 
get a first impression, though is insufficient to understand this newly-
established institution in China. Reading the statutes through both 
domestic and international contexts will be helpful to understand 
transparency in China, as well as to comparative law studies. 
First, domestic factors are crucial for the development of 
transparency in China. Motivated by possible economic 
achievements through openness (which is helpful to fair and 
effective management of administration), the common sense of 
openness was stressed, while conflicts between the right to know and 
the power to control information were not paid enough attention to at 
the early time of transparency development. 
Second, local government has played (and is still playing) an 
important role in building the institutions of government 
transparency. Municipalities and provincial governments can 
experiment with information disclosure more easily, and successful 
local legislation can serve as a basis for future state legislation.  
Third, careful attention should be paid to influences from 
international law. Treaties and other international instruments, like 
the WTO Agreement, can be the international legal source of China’s 
OGI legislation in a sense that the principle of transparency itself is 
not limited to the context of international trade, but rather extends to 
all areas in which government regulation is involved. Experiences of 
foreign countries also have a role to play, particularly as they help 
form opinions held by influential scholars. 
Fourth, an understanding of why these differences exist is more 
important than an assessment of the legal provisions of different 
countries under one (therefore simple) standard. Understanding 
reasons for differences is helpful for making reasonable forecasts for 
the future of a newly established institution in a developing country. 
Finally, lumping democracy together with transparency may 
appear to oversimplify the meaning and components of democracy. 
Transparency is fundamental to every aspect of democracy, 
including electoral procedure and public participation. But because it 
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also lies as a stepping stone on the path to procedural fairness, or due 
process, transparency is especially important in developing countries 
like China, where the long journey towards democracy and the rule 
of law began merely thirty years ago. Without a well-informed 
citizenry, public participation is impossible; so too are fair elections. 
Fueled by the information age, transparency is not only developing 
faster than ever but like democracy, it is becoming harder to reverse. 
 
